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We  present  a distinctiveness,  relevance  and  plausibility  (DRP)  method  for systematically
evaluating  potential  experimental  confounds.  A  claim  is  a statement  being  inferred  on the
basis of  experimental  data  analysis.  A potential  confound  is  a statement  providing  a prima
facie reason  why the  claim  is  not  justiﬁed  (other  than  internal  weakness).  In  evaluating
whether  a potential  confound  is problematic,  we can  start  by asking  whether  the  potential
confound  is  distinctive  from  the  claim;  we  can  then  ask whether  it is  relevant  for  the  claim;
and  we  can  conclude  by  asking  whether  it  is  plausible  in the  light  of  the  evidence.
© 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
. Introduction
Assume that an experimental paper makes a claim A. What happens if there is a potential experimental confound B that
ay affect behavior in the experiment and hence the validity of the claim? Examples are confusion effects (Ferraro and
ossler, 2010), experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010), framing effects (Cookson, 2000), house money effects (Harrison,
007), demographic effects (Casari et al., 2007), wealth effects (Armantier, 2006), incentives size effects (Slonim and Roth,
998), task order effects (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992), sample selection effects (Harrison et al., 2009), risk aversion effects
Vieider, 2011), behavioral noise effects (Hey, 2005), lack of credibility of experimental instructions due to the use of
eception (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001), or lack of control for social preferences explanations (Gächter et al., 2012) or
or expectations about the coplayer (Ashraf et al., 2006).The aim of this paper is to provide a method to identify when potential confounds are a problem for the claims made in an
xperimental paper, and, if they are a problem, what are valid ways of addressing it. Experimental economics textbooks and,
ore generally, research methods textbooks have a general discussion of standard responses to the problems of experimental
onfounds (e.g., Davis and Holt, 1993; Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Jackson, 2008). While there is plenty of econometric
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guidance in the literature,2 what is missing is a general methodological analysis of how to handle experimental confounds
that goes beyond what can be found in the introductory textbooks, and that may  be useful especially for junior researchers
designing or evaluating experiments.
We  try to ask the question of when experimental economists should be worried about potential confounds. We  are
interested in providing an evaluation methodology of interest especially to junior researchers designing and running exper-
iments and, when an experiment has been run and a paper completed, of interest to editors, referees and indeed the wider
readership in evaluating an experimental paper, or to the authors of such paper in determining what to do next.
Our method centers around the notions of distinctiveness, relevance and plausibility (DRP) of a potential confound. We
discuss the use of these concepts in the light of a number of practical examples and show how our DRP method can be
employed to systematically evaluate potential confounds criticisms. We  also review, in the light of the DRP method, other
arguments that have been made or can be made to defend experimental designs against potential confound criticisms.
Section 2 provides the general conceptual framework and background, Sections 3, 4 and 5 respectively introduce the
notions of distinctiveness, relevance and plausibility of potential confounds. Section 6 considers the implications of the DRP
method as a whole, summarizes the method with a table and discusses what the method can and cannot be used for. Section
7 employs the DRP method to evaluate other arguments on potential confounds. Section 8 concludes.
2. The conceptual framework
Deﬁne a claim as a statement being inferred in a paper P on the basis of experimental data analysis E. We  consider one
such claim, which we label as A, and we deﬁne a claim D which is different from A.
One reason A may  not be justiﬁed is that it may  not be supported by E as stated in the paper, which we  can label as
E|P. If (E|P ⇒ A) is not justiﬁed, that is if the experimental data analysis as stated in the paper does not imply A, then the
experimental data analysis does not support the claim A, and so the claim A is in itself not justiﬁed.3 We  can label this
situation as one of internal weakness.4
Deﬁne a potential confound as a statement providing a prima facie reason why  A is not justiﬁed other than inter-
nal weakness.5 Let us consider one such potential confound, which we  label as B; examples have been provided in the
introduction. That is, it is possible that E|P ⇒ A, but nevertheless B ⇒ D.
We  now need to identify a parsimonious and yet comprehensive procedure by which we  can test for whether a potential
confound should be considered a problem. The ﬁrst question we  can ask is whether A and B are essentially the same. That
is to say, the statement (B ⇒ D) is criticized on the ground of the relationship between A and B. If B is equivalent to A, then
B is not a problem for A: that is, B ⇔ A. If B is truly different (distinctive) from A, then based on this test we cannot rule out
that (B ⇒ D). This is a distinctiveness test of the potential confound.
Assume that B is distinctive from A. The second question we can ask is whether B negates A in principle. That is to
say, the statement (B ⇒ D) is criticized on the ground of the relationship between A and D. If the confound has passed the
distinctiveness test, we know that D is different from A, but this does not mean that D necessarily contradicts A. The potential
confound B may  imply D, but may  not be relevant for whether A holds. If B is irrelevant, D can be true but at the same time
A can also be true. This is a relevance test of the potential confound.
Assume that B is both distinctive from A and relevant for A. The third and ﬁnal question we  can ask is whether, based on
all available evidence, it is plausible to believe that (B ⇒ D) is true in practice. This is no longer a logical test in the sense of
distinctiveness and relevance, but rather a consideration of whether the potential confound is plausible from an empirical
viewpoint. This is a plausibility test of the potential confound.
The next three sections provide examples of the use of the distinctiveness, relevance and plausibility tests. We  have
simpliﬁed our analysis to the existence of a single potential confound B, but our analysis easily extends to considering
multiple potential confounds.6 If a potential confound is distinctive, relevant and plausible, then it is a problem that needs
to be addressed and Section 6 provides a discussion.
We believe the procedure to be comprehensive in the sense that evaluating B means to evaluate the relationship (B ⇒ D),
and this can either mean to question each part of this relationship with A (i.e. B with A, B with D), which is what the distinc-
tiveness and relevance tests do, or to question the validity of the whole of the relationship, which is what the plausibility
test does. Obviously different evaluation procedures might be possible and this paper does not preclude research on further
2 Experimental designs can be run to ameliorate the problem; random samples can be used; various sources of confounding can be controlled for using
covariates or using suitable econometric tools such as instrumental variables. See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) for a standard econometric analysis
and  Greenland et al. (1999) for an example of analysis from a statistician’s perspective on confounding.
3 An example is if a claim is made that a speciﬁc frame induces more cooperation in a public good contribution game when in fact, in looking at the
regression analysis on contribution the data analysis section of the paper is centered upon, the sign is statistically signiﬁcant but negative, i.e. in the opposite
direction of the claim.
4 We  label it as internal since the lack of justiﬁcation is based on the data analysis in paper P which is supposed to underpin the claim A made also in
paper  P.
5 For examples of deﬁnitions of confounds, see Mill (1843/2009), Patten (2007) and Jackson (2008).
6 In Section 7 we shall consider an argument that will require us to consider two  potential confounds at the same time.
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lassiﬁcations; one advantage of the one adopted here is that, in classifying all issues under three possible dimensions, it is
uitably parsimonious. In Section 7 we consider additional potential dimensions, and show that they are not needed.
We note, in passing, that the nature of the claim A will depend on the type of experiment. Davis and Holt (1993) classify
xperiments depending on whether they test behavioral hypotheses from theories, whether they are theory stress tests (i.e.,
o check for robustness) and whether they aim to identify empirical regularities. Experiments providing advice to policy
akers may  also exist (Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Schram, 2005). There are, in addition, different views of how experiments
elate to theoretical models and the real world (e.g., Jones, 2008; Guala, 2005; Schram, 2005; Sugden, 2005), and this in turn
ay affect what claims are made.
. Distinctiveness
The potential confound B needs to be distinctive from the claim A in order for it to be a potential problem. A typical case
here this is not met  is where the potential confound is the actual object of investigation.
Example 1. Requate and Waichman (2011) verify if Cournot market experiments outcomes differ depending on whether
he experimental instructions contain (a) a proﬁt table, (b) a proﬁt calculator without a best-response option or (c) a proﬁt
alculator with a best-response option. They make the claim A that, while the ﬁrst two options bring about the same
utcomes, option (c) “tends to increase aggregate output to the Cournot level and decrease the incidence of tacit collusion”
p. 36, abstract). The potential confound B here is that the method of provision of proﬁt information affects the outcomes of
ournot market experiments. Obviously A and B are essentially equivalent in this case. As identifying the effect of different
ethods of provision of proﬁt information is precisely what the claim A is about, the distinctiveness test is failed and there
s no problem for A.
. Relevance
As noted earlier, the relevance test is about whether the potential confound B is relevant for the truthfulness of claim
. This depends on whether the statement that B implies D (B ⇒ D) has any bearing on whether A is true, which in turns
epends on the relationship between A and D.
Orthogonality. Assume that A and D are entirely unrelated, in the sense that D is not a claim of an action or outcome that
oes systematically either in the direction of or in the opposite direction of the experimental actions or outcomes implied
y the experimental claim. In this case we can say that B is orthogonal to A. If so, then B is not relevant since (B ⇒ D) does
ot affect whether A is justiﬁed.
Example 2. Huck et al. (2004) found that, in a Cournot market experiment setting, a market frame led to more competitive
utcomes than if a neutral frame was employed.7 We  may  ask whether this potential confound is relevant for the claims
ade in Huck et al. (1999) regarding the performance of different learning theories in Cournot market experiments. While
uck et al. (1999) only used a market frame, it is not obvious that the signiﬁcance of the market frame has any bearing for
laims about the performance of learning theories relative to another. In this sense the potential confound is orthogonal to
he claims made in Huck et al. (1999).
Contrary relevance. Assume that D is a claim of an action or outcome that goes in the opposite direction of the action or
utcome stated with claim A. This means that, as B ⇒ D, B works in the opposite direction of the prediction stated in claim
. If so and if there is still evidence for A notwithstanding the fact that B implies D, B is irrelevant. The only case in which B
s relevant is if claim A acknowledges limited evidential support for the action or outcome. We  do not then know whether
uch limited evidence is due to (B ⇒ D) or not. In this case we can speak of contrary relevance of B.
Example 3. Millner et al. (1990) ran a continuous-time market experiment in which they tested market contestability
heory, according to which the threat of hit-and-run entry is enough to keep market outcomes competitive even with a
ingle market incumbent. Their claim is that the evidence is against contestability theory.8 A potential confound B here is
oredom. The claim D can be made that, due to boredom, subjects are less likely to stay out of the market and do nothing.
his would lead subjects to engage in more hit-and-run entry and get outcomes more aligned with contestability theory.
owever, as D implies behavior more aligned with contestability theory and A is a claim about having found evidential
upport for the opposite conclusion, the potential confound is not a problem.9 If anything, it is the more striking to ﬁnd
vidence against contestability theory precisely because there should be a bias toward contestability theory if subjects are
ored from doing nothing.
Same direction relevance. Assume that D is a claim of an action or outcome that goes in the same direction as the action or
utcome stated with claim A. For example, both A and D are claims about the same action being taken by subjects. However,
 identiﬁes a reason why  the action or outcome takes place, and, assuming that B has passed the distinctiveness test, this
7 The market frame used terms such as ‘ﬁrms’, ‘markets’ and ‘price’; the neutral frame did not.
8 As stated in the abstract (p. 584), “the average efﬁciency of markets contestable by two  ﬁrms. . . was signiﬁcantly less than that associated with the
ustainable equilibrium”, where the ‘sustainable equilibrium’ is as deﬁned by contestability theory.
9 A reviewer wondered whether B can be considered a confound with respect to the magnitude of the effect. If the claim A were about a speciﬁc magnitude
f  the effect, then the answer would be yes, but this is not what Millner et al. (1990) are claiming.
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reason is not B. That being so, we cannot say whether A is true or not based on the evidence, as the evidence could both be
interpreted as claimed by A or as claimed by B. In this case we  can speak of same direction relevance of B.
Example 4. Benjamin et al. (2010) present an experiment on social identity and preferences. They begin their conclusions
section with the claim A that “our results suggest that social identity affects fundamental economic preferences” (p. 1925).
They started each experimental session with a ‘background questionnaire’ the goal of which was  to make ethnicity or gender
salient for the subjects. The potential confound B here is that the background questionnaire reinforces the effect of social
identity in a way which would not be observed in the real world. The action D induced by the potential confound B in
this case is to increase the behavior conforming to a speciﬁc social identity (based on ethnicity or gender). There is then a
same direction relevance problem, since it is not possible to differentiate whether the evidence backs a ‘fundamental’ effect
of social identity on economic preferences or, more modestly, the effect of salience which may be especially strong in an
experimental environment.
Magnifying glass relevance. Consider a magnifying glass. It is an artiﬁcial tool that helps the observer study a real world
object by artiﬁcially increasing its visual size. Now consider a potential confound B with same direction relevance. B may
identify an experimental design feature by which the equivalent of a key real world feature is implemented or facilitated, if
artiﬁcially. In this case the experimental design feature may be desirable insofar as it strengthens the real world signiﬁcance
of the claim A being made. In this case we can speak of magnifying glass relevance of B.
Example 5. Chaudhuri et al. (2009) looked at the role of intergenerational advice in the context of weakest link coordination
games. The areas of application are suggested to be macroeconomic equilibrium traps in developing countries, speculative
attacks, bank runs and political revolutions. It is implied that the results of the experiments apply to these contexts; in the
conclusion, a claim A is explicitly made in terms of message from the experiment for “policy makers (like central bankers) to
be able to coordinate a move from a sub-optimal (underemployment) equilibrium” (p. 118). The potential confound here is
that there is an experimenter demand effect B.10 It may  increase the degree to which subjects pay attention to advice given
by other subjects. Because of this, B has same direction relevance for A.
Assume, however, that the claim made by Chaudhuri et al. (2009) is rephrased to apply not to policy settings but rather
to organizational settings. In other words, we consider the weakest link game as applying to the context of an organization
(as, e.g., in Brandts et al., 2010). In this context, intergenerational advice can be reinterpreted as being advice that new
generations of employees receive from existing employers. The experimenter demand effect would then artiﬁcially mirror
in the laboratory the social pressure that would be present in the real world organizational setting. If we  rephrase A this
way, we can then argue for the magnifying glass relevance of B.11
5. Plausibility
Assume that the potential confound B is distinctive and relevant. It does not necessarily follow that A is not justiﬁed. As
discussed in Section 2, B may  be empirically implausible, in which case we  would still be in a position to make the claim A.
Direct evidence. B may  have been tested in the relevant domain. This would directly answer to the question of whether B
is plausible.
Example 1 (again). As discussed above, Requate and Waichman (2011) test if Cournot market experiments outcomes
depend on whether the experimental instructions contain (a) a proﬁt table, (b) a proﬁt calculator without a best-response
option or (c) a proﬁt calculator with a best-response option. As a result, if B is about how payoffs are provided in Cournot
market experiments, it would be possible to use their evidence in favor or against the plausibility of B.
Example 6. A number of experimental papers employ dictator games to make claims about the effect of a number of factors
on social preferences (e.g., Andreoni and Miller, 2002, or Haisley and Weber, 2010) or norms (Guala and Mittone, 2010).12
The problem here is that the dictator game is a highly artiﬁcial task where, for no apparent reason, subjects are asked to
consider giving signiﬁcant amounts of money to strangers (e.g., Bardsley, 2005; Smith, 2010). The potential confound B here
is (a) that there is an experimental demand to give and (b) that the cues offered by the experimental environment help
subjects make sense of how much they should give.
List (2007), Bardsley (2005) and Zizzo and Fleming (2011) discuss direct evidence showing how experimenter demand
shapes dictator game behavior. List’s (2007) and Bardsley’s (2005) evidence is based on a simple change of the range of
possible actions to include taking rather than just giving: this can reverse the agents’ apparent generosity. Zizzo and Fleming
(2011) ﬁnd that behavior in a dictator game is connected to a standard questionnaire measure of sensitivity to social pressure
(Stöber, 2001). They also ﬁnd that, when a dictator game and a symmetrical back to back destruction game in which the
ﬁrst mover can simply destroy money of the second mover are played, there is a positive relationship between giving and
destroying, which is what B predicts.
10 As deﬁned in Zizzo (2010), experimenter demand effects refer to changes in behavior by experimental subjects due to cues about what constitutes
appropriate behavior in the experiment.
11 Note that, since in the real world there is not the equivalent of constant experimenter-induced priming of social identity, the magnifying glass relevance
argument cannot be used in relation to Example 4 and Benjamin et al.’s (2010) claim of a fundamental effect of social identity on preferences.
12 For example, the claim A is made in Andreoni and Miller (2002, p. 737) that “subjects exhibit a signiﬁcant degree of rationally altruistic behavior”.
Guala and Mittone (2010) reinterpret the dictator game as being useful to investigate social norms rather than preferences. However, it is not clear to what
extent the so-measured social norms are an artifact or an inﬂated by-product of experimenter demand.
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Table  1
A  distinctiveness, relevance and plausibility (DRP) method.
Test Key points Does B pass the test?
Distinctiveness A is equivalent to B
A  is distinctive from B Yes
Relevance Orthogonality of A and B
B works against A but supportive evidence for A
Contrary relevance Yes
Same direction relevance: no magnifying glass relevance Yes
Magnifying glass relevance
Plausibility Direct evidence supportive of B Yes
Indirect evidence supportive of B Yes
Global plausibility in favor of B Yes
Options if problem in terms of distinctiveness and relevance and plausibility
Actions Follow up
Drop A
Run additional statistical analysis if appropriate data available Iterate process
Do  additional appropriate experimental treatments if feasible Iterate process
Modify A Iterate process
This table provides a check-list for the use of the DRP method. The method considers the relationship between a claim A and a potential confound B in the
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hat  to do if a problem in terms of distinctiveness, relevance and plausibility emerges.
Indirect evidence. There may  be behavioral patterns that A can explain but B cannot explain. This is indirect, if not
ecessarily conclusive, evidence against the plausibility of B.
Example 7. Nikiforakis (2008) makes the claim A that, in a social dilemma setting, “in the presence of counter-punishment
pportunities cooperators are less willing to punish free riders” (p. 91, from the abstract). A potential confound B here is
hat, as a rule of thumb, some subjects may  simply mechanically anchor the counter-punishment points to the punishment
oints values observed. The implied action D is that, because of this experimental rule of thumb, cooperators may  then be
ess willing to punish free-riders. Indirect evidence against B is however presented in Nikiforakis (2008); for example, there
s more counter-punishment when subjects are repeatedly re-matched with the same coplayers than when they are not.
his pattern of behavior cannot be explained by B.
Global plausibility test. In many cases there will not be directly or indirectly applicable evidence. However, it should still
e possible, based on the available evidence at a given point in time, to reach a judgment about the plausibility of B relative
o claim A.
Example 6 (again). A feature of dictator game experiments is the extraordinary degree of sensitivity to the smallest
hanges in the design relative to other games, such as in deservingness (Hoffman et al., 1994), the opportunity to play an
nattractive lottery (Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger, 2008) or visual face like stimuli (Rigdon et al., 2009). Depending on
he experimental details, the fraction of givers varies widely, between the around 5 percent of the subjects of Cherry et al.
2002) and the over 95 percent of Branas-Garza (2006). Now assume that a claim is made about the wide signiﬁcance of
 framing effect based on dictator game results. This claim does not pass a global plausibility test. The reason is that the
yper-sensitivity to small changes in the experimental design is not observed in other settings.
. A DRP method
Distinctiveness, relevance and plausibility – or DRP for short – together provide a method to analyze whether a potential
onfound B is a problem for a claim A. Assume that B is distinctive from A, relevant for A, and plausible. Also assume that
 realistic case for magnifying glass relevance cannot be made. If these conditions apply, the claim A can be judged to be
roblematic.
There are then two options. If the researcher still wants to make the claim A and if it is feasible, he or she can re-design
he experiment or, if the experiment has already been run, do additional treatments or at least additional statistical analysis;
 can then be tested again for DRP. Alternatively, the researcher may  choose to drop or appropriately modify A. If A is
ppropriately modiﬁed, the evaluation process on whether B is a problem of A can be iterated in terms again of DRP of B.
able 1 provides the key points of a DRP method as discussed in this paper.
It is important to understand what the DRP method tries (and tries not) to achieve. It provides a method for researchers
esigning and running experiments. When an experiment has been run and a paper completed, it can be of interest to
ditors, referees and indeed the wider readership in evaluating an experimental paper, or to the authors of such a paper in
etermining what to do next in the light of a potential confound criticism. As we  shall see in the next section, this conceptual
ramework also enables us to evaluate other arguments that are sometimes used, explicitly and implicitly, as defenses
gainst criticisms of experimental confounds. What the DRP analysis does not provide (nor is it meant to) is a theory of
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scientiﬁc discovery.13 The judgments employed in a DRP method of a potential confound are judgments operating at a given
point in time. They are not meant to preclude research which may  change, even radically, those judgments in future DRP
analyses. For example, B may  appear irrelevant to A but, in the light of new research, this may  change; or what may  be seen
as plausible today may, in the light of new research, be shown to be implausible, or vice versa. That better science can be
made in the future when greater knowledge is available is of course just to be expected in a healthy progressive scientiﬁc
research paradigm, and does not preclude the usefulness of making DRP evaluations in the here and now based on what is
currently known.
Another potential problem with a DRP analysis is that the number of potential confounds can in principle be very large if
not logically inﬁnite (see Smith, 1994). While this is true in principle, in practice the number of plausible (and relevant and
distinctive) confounds will typically be a ﬁnite list (see Guala, 2002, for a similar argument). Also, if appropriate qualiﬁcations
are made to A, it is conceivable that a paper might be publishable even if B is a potential problem.
Given the word constraints of experimental papers, it is obviously not practical for all potential confounds to be explicitly
dealt with in the discussion section; many potential confounds will be evidently implausible or irrelevant. Nevertheless,
an appropriate discussion of relevant potential confounds is appropriate at least for full length experimental papers; this
occurs in a number of cases but not (adequately) in others.
A DRP analysis can also be worthwhile to evaluate papers, or possibly re-evaluate them in a different light than those
from the authors.
Example 5 (again). Example 5 above is a good illustration of this point. In this example we reviewed Chaudhuri et al.’s
(2009) experiment on intergenerational advice in the context of weakest link coordination games. We  noted how, insofar as
claim A (about intergenerational advice) is supposed to apply to policy makers like central bankers, it is problematic. This is
because advice in the lab may  be especially effective due to experimenter demand, and as a result there is a same direction
relevance problem. Instead, if the claim A is modiﬁed to apply to an organizational context, the experimenter demand effect
would artiﬁcially mirror in the laboratory the social pressure that would be present in the real world organizational setting
(a case of magnifying glass relevance). A DRP analysis can therefore be used to put Chaudhuri et al.’s (2009) results in a
different light.
Example 6 (again). A DRP analysis of experimenter demand effects as a potential confound B can be used to identify
settings under which this potential confound is not a problem.
B does not pass the distinctiveness test if experimenter demand is what is being investigated using dictator games (as in
Zizzo and Fleming, 2011).
B does not pass the relevance test if one may  claim magnifying glass relevance. Assume that A relates explicitly to
charitable giving, and that the dictator game manipulation is of the kind that a charity could implement to increase funding.
One may  also assume that the experimenter demand is equivalent to the real world social pressure that the charity would
be able to implement, for example by the means of requesting donations through phone calls (Shang and Croson, 2009).14
B does not pass the plausibility test if a dictator game is used purely to refer to a sub-game of a more complex game
with a natural interpretation. Consider a standard Berg et al. (1995) sequential trust game. Once the trustee receives the
investment by the truster, the sub-game is equivalent to a dictator game with the trustee as the dictator. That said, there is
a natural interpretation for the whole interaction, which is that of a trust game.
7. Evaluating other arguments
We  are now in a position to employ the DRP framework to evaluate four other arguments that can be made to defend
experimental claims. We  label these arguments the norm defense, the resources defense, the confounds trade-off defense
and the claims trade-off defense.15
7.1. The norm defense
The norm defense states that a particular experimental design choice can be defended on the grounds that this is ‘what
everyone else does’ (or at least what a previous paper has done). A reference to a scientiﬁc norm, as established in a previous
paper or papers, is employed as a defense. In a normal scientiﬁc paradigm, this is healthy to some extent: replications and
extensions of previous experimental designs enable better interpretability and are part of a collective research process in
which, in the words of Smith (2010, p. 4), “we want to reduce error and to understand its sources”. That being said, ‘this is
what everyone else does’ is fundamentally a non-answer. It does not answer the question of why  B is not a problem in a
speciﬁc context, and, by careful selection of sources, it may  omit key evidence showing that B is indeed a problem. No doubt,
if B does not pass the relevance test, comparability with the previous literature suggests to do ‘what everyone else does’.
13 For one philosophy of science perspective on scientiﬁc discovery compatible with our analysis, see Mayo (1996).
14 Fong and Luttmer (2011) and Reinstein and Riener (2012) provide examples of dictator game experiments receiving some justiﬁcation in this way.
15 Another way of looking at these arguments is as extra dimensions (additional to distinctiveness, relevance and plausibility) that may  seem to be helpful
in  evaluating confounds. This section will make clear however that, insofar as they have any cogency, it is because they rely on distinctiveness, relevance
or  plausibility, and therefore these extra dimensions are not needed.
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owever, it is not clear on what grounds one would defend ‘what everyone else does’ if the potential confound is distinctive,
elevant and plausible (and does not have magnifying glass relevance).
Example 8. Armantier (2006) employed an ultimatum game with random matching repeated 60 times. There were only
wo sessions per treatment. Armantier makes claims regarding wealth effects affecting behavior. For example, a claim is
hat “with time. . . rich players become more greedy, and this behavior is tolerated by poor subjects” (p. 425).
A potential confound here is boredom. This would have been due the large number of identical rounds in an experiment
hat could last some 90 min.
Another potential confound here is the lack of independent observations given the combination of random matching and
nly two sessions per treatment. After the ﬁrst round, observations within the same sessions share a common history.
A response by Armantier is that “the number of rounds played” is “not unprecedented” and that it “is not uncom-
on to conduct few sessions” (p. 399). Yet the fact that a claim has a problem because of a potential confound does not
ean that other papers do not have the same problem, such as (in this example) boredom or lack of non-independence of
bservations.16
.2. Resources defense
The resources defense states that, although B is plausible, addressing it can be left for future research.17 It is true that no
ingle paper can do everything. It is also true that this is an especially serious problem for more innovative experimental
esigns. However, it is not obvious why, if B is distinctive, relevant and plausible, it should not be taken into account in some
ay. If a magnifying glass relevance argument cannot be made, or additional statistical analysis or experimental treatments
re unfeasible, the appropriate response is to modify the claim A rather than retain it as it is. Put it differently, limitations
f resources should not be used to justify a claim where there is a credible potential confound. At most, they can be used to
ustify how to respond to such a potential confound: for example, by modifying the claim rather than by running additional
xperimental treatments.
Example 9. Sutter et al. (2007, 2008) ran an experiment on group vs. individual decision making in the context of mobile
elephony license auctions of the kind run successfully in the UK. The motivation is that large companies, rather than
ndividuals, put bids for this auction. They made the claim A that their experiment provides “conclusive evidence for several
oteworthy differences in the bidding behavior of individuals and small teams”, and this is seen to “provide important
mplications. . . for real-world auctions” (Sutter et al., 2008, p. 390). In their experiment a large company is modeled as
 democratic team jointly deciding a bid. The potential confound B is that in the real world one would typically have a
eam advising an executive ofﬁcer in making a bid, rather than a democratic team. This different organizational structure
ould lead to behavior that may  or may  not be along the lines of the ‘noteworthy differences’ and ‘important implications’
dentiﬁed by Sutter et al. In a footnote of Sutter et al. (2007, p. 12), they use a resources defense by stating that this potential
onfound is a ‘plausible conjecture that could be tested in the future by running experiments where individual decision-
akers receive advice from others’. If it is plausible, it is not however clear why this should not modify the claim being
ade.18
Example 10. Experimental psychologists often argue with experimental economists on whether deception is justiﬁed in
unning experiments (for good overviews, see Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001, 2008). One argument used by some psychologists
o defend the use of deception has been that it is necessary to run experiments that would otherwise be unfeasible or require
igniﬁcant additional resources (Cook and Yamagishi, 2008).
I would argue that most experimental economists would intuitively think this argument weak. This can be argued on the
rounds that deception is a distinctive, relevant and plausible potential confound. It is seen as plausible because it implies
hat incentives are no longer salient in the sense of Smith (1982), both in relation to the experiment being run and potentially
due to loss of reputation) in relation to others run at the same laboratory.
.3. Confounds trade-off defense
A confounds trade-off defense argues that the reason why there is a potential confound is to avoid another potential
onfound.
Assume that there are two potential confounds, B and B′. There may  be a trade-off between them. Choices in experimental
esign that work toward neutralizing B, may  make B′ a more signiﬁcant problem. The reverse may  also be true. Trade-offs
f this kind are pervasive in experimental design.
16 Armantier also argues against the criticism of non-independence of observations based on some collected data. In our framework, this can be recast,
s  saying that in his view this potential confound does not pass the plausibility test.
17 Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is a not uncommon response by authors when revise and resubmits are obtained from journals with a request for
urther  experimental treatments. Example 9 below is one such case, as the footnote mentioned there was  introduced in response to a reviewer’s comment
Kocher, personal communication).
18 It is interesting to note that Sutter et al. (2008) dropped the footnote, implicitly (and perhaps optimistically) suggesting that the potential confound
as  not plausible after all.
D.J. Zizzo / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93 (2013) 186– 195 193
The pervasiveness of trade-offs of this kind does not however justify a confounds trade-off defense:
(i) the defense does not identify why the experimenter has chosen a speciﬁc point in the trade-off, e.g. by giving priority to B′ in
place of B. Identifying a speciﬁc point in the trade-off requires going back to considerations of plausibility and relevance
of the two potential confounds. It may  also require the experimenter to think whether he or she is more willing to modify
the claim A to recognize the potential confound B; or whether he or she is more willing to modify A to recognize the
potential confound B′;
(ii) the defense does not justify why the trade-off should be accepted in the ﬁrst place. Assume that the following conditions are
met, no matter how the trade-off is solved: both B and B′ are distinctive and relevant; neither of them can be set aside
on the grounds of magnifying glass relevance; both of them are plausible. If so, A cannot be rescued on the grounds of a
confounds trade-off defense, since any resolution of the trade-off would not sufﬁce to justify A.
Example 11. A well-known problem in preparing experimental instructions is deciding whether to frame the instructions
in an abstract or concrete way. There is typically a continuum of possible solutions. At one extreme, for example, one could
frame a market price making decision in terms of asking the subject to impersonate a business manager making price choices
for a company. At the other extreme, one could avoid talking of companies, prices or quantities and keep the problem in
strictly abstract terms (e.g., variables x, y and z).
On the one hand, asking the subject to play an ‘as if’ role and using concrete language may  be more prone to experimenter
demand effects. For example Holt (1992) notes the need to avoid loaded language. On the other hand, some concrete context
can help subjects’ understanding (Holt, 1992; Cooper and Kagel, 2003, 2009). Clearly, in choosing how to frame experimental
instructions, there will typically be a trade-off between the facilitation of understanding and the danger of experimenter
demand effects. Equally clearly, we would require instructions to provide a sufﬁcient degree of conﬁdence both in terms of
appropriate level of understanding and avoidance of experimenter demand effects. In order to achieve such conﬁdence, we
would test the distinctiveness, relevance and plausibility of both potential confounds in the light of the claim A being made.
7.4. Claims trade-off defense
A claims trade-off defense argues that the reason why there is a potential confound is because there are two  claims being
made in the experiments, which we can label as A and A′. The defense is that it is not possible to address B while trying to
achieve both A and A′.
This is a weak argument. It only shows that the experiment is being over-ambitious in what it is trying to achieve. If B is
plausible, distinctive and problematically relevant, a better strategy would be to achieve just A or A′ but do so in a way that
addresses B. Alternatively, one can revise A and/or A′ to explicitly acknowledge the limitation from the potential confound
B.19
Example 12. Fehr and Tyran (2001) aim to show indirect money illusion: namely, how “a small amount of money illusion”
(p. 1239) at the individual level may  cause big changes in aggregate market price setting behavior after negative nominal
shocks (label this as A). They also make the claim that stated expectations of subjects (about pricing decisions of other
subjects) are “very sticky” in a way that is related to “the nature of money illusion in our experiment” (p. 1259; label this
claim as A′). To prove both A and A′, they collect not only price decisions but also expectations about the mean price chosen
by the other subjects and indeed their conﬁdence about these expectations. A potential confound B is that, by asking subjects
explicitly to think about expectations, one is collecting evidence for A′ (in terms of stated expectations) but is also enhancing
the extent to which subjects take expectations of other subjects in their decision making on prices, thus creating a problem
for A.20 In other words, by asking for expectations one makes it potentially more likely that a small amount of money illusion
has the claimed effect. It is not a satisfactory response to say that there is a desire to make both claims even if there is a
trade-off between the two. The issue instead is with the distinctiveness, relevance and plausibility of B.
8. Conclusions
We  have presented a distinctiveness, relevance and plausibility (DRP) method for evaluating potential confounds. The
method is summarized in Table 1 above. It is comprehensive insofar as, if there is a claim (A) and a potential confound (B),
we can logically start by asking whether B is actually different from A (distinctiveness test); we can then ask whether B
actually contradicts A in principle (relevance test); and we  can conclude by asking whether B does contradict A in practice,
in the light of the evidence available at a given point of time (plausibility test). While we have considered four potential
alternative dimensions in Section 7, the three identiﬁed here provide a systematic, parsimonious and comprehensive toolkit
to test the signiﬁcance of potential cofounds.
19 Still alternative solutions, if feasible to address the problem, would be to run additional experimental treatments or at least additional statistical
analysis, and see whether this provides evidence showing that B is implausible.
20 For example, Rustrom and Wilcox (2009) and Gächter and Renner (2010) show how belief elicitation can distort behavior in a repeated matching
pennies game and in a public good contribution setup respectively.
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Our analysis aims to ﬁll what is currently a serious gap in methodological thinking about experimental design. The gap
s particularly striking given the explosive growth of experimental research in academic journals. It is hoped that using the
RP method can help foster more disciplined experimental designs and more systematic and transparent evaluations of
xperimental designs and of experimental claims at any given point in time. Obviously further methodological work will
e useful to analyze the implications of a DRP method in the context of speciﬁc potential confounds, including ones (such
s demographic effects) that we have not touched on in this paper. This paper will have achieved its minimal goal if it
ncourages further pragmatic research on how to design and evaluate experiments.
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